96 quotes from judges and prosecutors that explain why Catalan separatist leaders are still in jail
(17/10/2018) have revised 24 judicial decisions and statements from the Public Prosecutor’s Office from the last twelve months.
(Original published: 17/10/2018)
The goal, shared strategy, use of crowds, violence and force
The events of September 20, a key meeting on September 28, the vote on October 1
Role of Catalan Police and the risk of reoffending
Along with an independent republic, the major political aim for Catalan separatists this year is to try to get nine political leaders out of jail, where they have been on remand (pre-trial custody) since last October, November or March, accused either of rebellion or rebellion and the misuse of public funds.
The First Minister of Catalonia, Quim Torra (Together for Catalonia) said during a debate in the regional parliament last week that “It is the central issue of this parliament and must be resolved”. He described the nine jailed men and women as “political prisoners” and the group abroad that includes Carles Puigdemont as “exiles”.
Tuesday marked the first anniversary of the first two of the group—former Catalan National Assembly chairman Jordi Sánchez and former Omnium Cultural chairman Jordi Cuixart—being sent to prison.
On Monday, Amnesty International in Spain issued a new statement on the issue, describing their continuing period of remand as “unjustifiable” and calling for their “immediate” release.
Over the weekend, Esquerra MP Joan Tardà demanded the government order the Public Prosecutor’s Office to withdraw the accusations against the jailed separatists. Justice Minister Dolores Delgado said on Monday that prosecutors were “fully independent”.
And on Tuesday morning, a former chief justice of the Supreme and Constitutional courts, and of Spain’s General Council of Judicial Power, Pascual Sala, told a Catalan radio station, RAC1, that while he did not think talk of rebellion was “an exaggeration”, in his opinion it would be “difficult, if not impossible” to prove it, and “problematic” to prove sedition.
But why are the nine in jail on remand (pre-trial custody) at all, then? If we only believe the version offered by separatist propaganda, or we only look at the latest news bulletin or Twitter headline, we cannot understand the reasons.
To find out, I have revised 24 judicial decisions and statements from the Public Prosecutor’s Office from the last twelve months, starting with the initial criminal complaint filed on September 22, 2017, and working through several appeals and the decisions from both the Supreme Court and the National High Court that sent separatist leaders to trial for different combinations of rebellion, sedition, contempt or the misuse of public funds, as well as the decisions from a court in Cornellà (Barcelona) investigating the role and responsibility of a senior group of Catalan Police officers.
Note 1: you can consult the full list of 600 quotes here (in Spanish).
Note 2: when you finish reading, please support independent reporting a little here
Note 3: these are all quotes from different courts in the investigative phase of the criminal legal process in Spain, which is overseen by judges. No trial dates have yet been set.
——The 96 Quotes——
The aim
“The ultimate aim of these mobilisations is to achieve the organisation of a referendum to achieve the proclamation of a Catalan republic independent from Spain, being aware that they are carrying out an activity outside of the law, preventing the application of legislation in its entirety and, particularly, of the fundamental law that belongs to all Spaniards, the Constitution” (Public Prosecutor, 22/09/2017)
“…all of the suspects in the case share, and recognise that they still hold, the same aspiration that drove the behaviour under investigation, which is the will for the territory of the autonomous community in which they live to constitute the territorial base of a new republic.” (Supreme Court, 04/12/2017)
“All of the above, [he] concludes, was oriented towards making it easier to hold the referendum and then to proclaim a Catalan Republic independent from Spain outside legal routes and by ignoring the mandate received from the regional high court in Catalonia, and against the rulings handed down by the Constitutional Court”. (Cornellà, 28/03/2018)
“…the existence of a complex, heterogeneous organisation, united for the aim of achieving the secession of the autonomous community of Catalonia and its proclamation as an independent republic has been verified, thus altering the way in which the state is organised politically and also governed, in clear contravention of constitutional and statutory order.” (National High Court, 04/04/2018)
The shared strategy
“…the main point is that the investigation points towards [him] having participated in a relevant manner in the execution of a road map designed and programmed for that ultimate goal of independence outside of any legal route, in which the contribution of violence and the provocation of tense, conflictive situations by those, like the suspect making the appeal, who use it, is one more facet that cannot go unnoticed” (National High Court, 06/11/2017)
“On December 19, 2012, Artur Mas Gavarró, then a candidate to become the First Minister of the Government of Catalonia, and leader of the political party Convergencia i Unió (CiU), signed with Oriol Junqueras, chairman of the political party Republican Catalan Left (ERC), the ‘Agreement for National Transition and to Guarantee the Stability of the Government of Catalonia’” (Supreme Court, 21/03/2018)
“…the Catalan Parliament, in its Resolution 5/X of January 23, 2013, approved a Declaration of sovereignty and of the right to decide of the people of Catalonia.” (Supreme Court, 21/03/2018)
“…on February 12, 2013, Decree 113/2013 was approved by the Department of the Office of the First Minister of the Government of Catalonia, to create the ‘Advisory Council on the National Transition’” (Supreme Court, 21/03/2018)
“…reflects the existence of a group of individuals (Strategic Committee) who have had a defining role in how and when to carry out each one of the actions in the process and, consequently, the violence and disorder…” (Supreme Court, 04/12/2017)
“A Strategic Committee of which Mr. Oriol Junqueras i Vies, Mr. Jordi Sánchez Picanyol and Mr. Jordi Cuixart Navarro were members, but not the rest of the suspects now examined.” (Supreme Court, 04/12/2017)
“Thus on March 30, 2015, a route map for the independence process was agreed upon, not only by the political parties CDC and ERC but also by the organisations Omnium Cultural (today chaired by the appellant) and the Catalan National Assembly, as well as the Association of Towns for Independence (AMI)” (Supreme Court, 04/12/2017)
“And days later, on April 12, 2015, the ANC drew up a document that fixed its specific path of action for the years 2015 and 2016” (Supreme Court, 04/12/017)
“The agreement is apparent in the investigation that has been carried out.” (Supreme Court, 09/03/3017)
“There is also a document called Enfocats (which the suspects deny knowledge of, but which summarises a strategy borne out by real events)…” (Supreme Court, 09/03/3018)
“They are thus following the plan for secession laid out in the Enfocats document, in which the issue of a constituent parliament is addressed after the disconnection from the Spanish state, and in which the need to persevere in the strategy and aims is expressed in the case of the state taking control of institutions in the autonomous community.” (Supreme Court, 06/02/2018)
“…numerous speeches by political representatives and pro-independence associations are described, in which shared, coordinated action is endorsed…” (Supreme Court, 09/03/2018)
“…on July 31, 2017, the self-determination referendum bill was tabled in the Catalan Parliament.” (Supreme Court, 21/03/2018)
“Likewise, on August 28, 2017, the legal transition and foundation of the republic bill was tabled in the Catalan Parliament” (Supreme Court, 21/03/2018)
“The plan drawn up in the EnfoCATs document corresponds perfectly to each of the steps taken by the organisation in question over the longer than two year period, including the unilateral declaration of independence.” (National High Court, 04/04/2018)
The use of crowds
“…the White Paper expressly indicates that: “the support of mobilised civil society could very well constitute a decisive factor for this objective [forcing the state to negotiate]” (Supreme Court, 21/03/2018)
“And days later, on April 12, 2015, the ANC drew up a document that fixed its specific path of action for the years 2015 and 2016 […] it was said that faced with the possibility that the Catalan Government might be ‘suspended legally and politically by the Spanish state and/or a pro-independence party declared illegal’, it was stated that in those scenarios ‘the citizenry emerges as the political actor that will drive the independence process’.” (Supreme Court, 04/12/2017)
“The resolution expressed that the incorporation of citizen mobilisation as an instrument that would allow for the achievement of the secessionist aim, has some specific elements of support to it that, with the firmness one might demand of investigative work, distance the idea that this might be a merely speculative suggestion.” (Supreme Court, 04/12/2017)
“…Enfocats, includes a strategic definition of the procedure to be followed to achieve the independence of Catalonia, in which it is concluded that ‘as a last option, a democratic conflict with broad citizen support should be generated’, with the indication that the instrument would force the state to negotiate separation or proceed to a forced referendum.” (Supreme Court, 04/12/2017)
“…page 31 reiterates that, in order to go down the unilateral path if necessary, a broad social mobilisation must be gradually encouraged.” (Supreme Court, 04/12/2017)
“The diary seized from Mr. Josep María Jové not only proves the meeting between pro-independence political parties and the representatives of the ANC and Omnium Cultural, but also that they considered citizen mobilisation as a strategic element to achieve independence (statement on December 15, 2017, statement on January 31, 2018).” (Supreme Court, 06/02/2018)
“…the investigation reflects the participation of the organisation Catalan National Assembly (ANC) and its then chairman Jordi Sánchez, in an agreement of the willing oriented towards achieving the independence of the autonomous community of Catalonia and in which different instruments for action were considered, among which was the mechanism of achieving a high level of citizen mobilisation to force the state to accept a new republic.” (Supreme Court, 09/03/2018)
“In parallel, pro-independence civic associations took on the responsibility of creating greater social acceptance of the secessionist initiatives, as well as encouraging the public belief that the proclamation of the republic was perfectly viable, seeking, finally, an intense citizen mobilisation that would encourage the state to end up accepting the independence of Catalonia, faced with the unfolding reality.” (Supreme Court, 09/03/2018)
“The Enfocats document, whose concordance with the forecast plans has been analysed, also recognises the need for an increasingly large collective mobilisation, dependent on the reaction of the state.” (Supreme Court, 21/03/2018)
“The push for and calling of mobilisations of different intensity has been documented in the days prior to the vote on October 1, as well as two general strikes, mobilisations, protests against specific figures, and public order incidents in the days following the [central] government’s intervention.” (Supreme Court, 21/03/2018)
“…an action was carried out through popular movements designed to create among citizens a feeling of rejection towards Spanish institutions and the powers of the state, in order to encourage and justify society disobeying orders emanating from them and to allow, when necessary, for social mobilisation in order to support the achievement of pro-independence aims.” (National High Court, 04/04/2018)
Violence and force
“…as well as physical force, moments of ‘vis compulsiva’ [non-physical force] are described and the actions of the appellant under investigation are placed outside of the law for the achievement of the illicit ends that he was involved in, directed towards changing the organisation of the state and declaring the independence of a part of the national territory.” (National High Court, 06/11/2017)
“The same does not happen as regards some of the suspects under consideration today […] Sánchez […] Cuixart […] whose contributions are directly linked to a violent explosion that, were it to reoccur, leaves no margin for correction or satisfaction by those who would be affected by it.” (Supreme Court, 04/12/2017)
“There are several pieces of data from the investigation that link a contribution from these suspects directly to the use of violence.” (Supreme Court, 04/12/2017)
“…which is reflected in his push for large mobilisations of citizens that—as described in the decision on December 4, 2017—encouraged a social uprising, and specifically stimulated or accepted the risk that an unrepairable violent reaction contrary to coexistence and contrary to the territorial organisation of the state would spread.” (Supreme Court, 06/02/2018)
“On the other hand, from a conclusive judgement that is only useful for investigative decisions adopted during this stage of the process, the violent collective confrontation used as an instrument to obtain the secession of the territory of Catalonia, introduces into the population a risk of physical harm that is not acceptable in individual and collective terms.” (Supreme Court, 09/03/2018)
“In any case, the facts that have been narrated as those that happened on September 20, 2017 in front of the regional economy ministry [in Barcelona] reflect all of the requirements that have been identified for violent action and even for violence.” (Supreme Court, 21/03/2018)
“In this way, that mass of people was used, taking advantage of the undeniable intimidatory and coercive force that the presence of a compact group of many people ready to resist Police Officers produces, and incurred, in conclusion, in a conduct that can clearly be included in the crime of sedition as described in the Criminal Code.” (National High Court, 04/04/2018)
“…the defining aspect of violence is centred on if the force was deployed as an instrument oriented towards restricting the capacity of action of the passive subject or, on the contrary, is exercised to condition merely his capacity to decide. That is the element that allows for an appreciation of whether the force deployed satisfies the concept of exercising violence or, on the contrary, is limited to an end that is merely intimidatory.” (Supreme Court, 09/05/2018)
“And it is in those terms in which it can be concluded that force was exercised to physically restrict the field of action of the officers and [was] not exclusively oriented towards exercising coercive pressure more proper of intimidation.” (Supreme Court, 09/05/2018)
“In any case, during the events that occurred on October 1, violence was expressed with the end result of causing injury to several officers…” (Supreme Court, 09/05/2018)
El 20 de septiembre
“…in the ruling dated October 11 last, it was noted that the events that occurred on September 21 and 22 were not an isolated, casual citizen protest that was called peacefully […] on the contrary […] they can be framed within a complex strategy with which the suspects Jordi Cuixart and Jordi Sánchez have been collaborating for some time, while executing the route map designed to obtain the independence of Catalonia.” (National High Court, 16/10/2017)
“Said gatherings were promoted by different pro-independence associations, with the most notable because of their ability to gather people being the ones organised by the leaders of the pro-independence organisations Catalan National Assembly (ANC) and Omnium Cultural, Jordi Sánchez Picanyol and Jordi Cuixart Navarro, respectively.” (National High Court, 16/10/2017)
“Jordi Sánchez Picanyol and Jordi Cuixart Navarro used social networks and ANC and Omnium distribution groups to mobilise people against judicial orders.” (National High Court, 16/10/2017)
“…on the 20th, alert messages were received that the Civil Guard was carrying out searches in different official Catalan government buildings, encouraging people to attend “gatherings right now to stop the Civil Guard” […] which later led to the siege of the judicial party…” (National High Court, 16/10/2017)
“Via the aforementioned announcements, a call was made not for a peaceful gathering or protest, but for the “protection” of their leaders and institutions, via mass citizen mobilisations, in front of the places police activities were taking place” (National High Court, 16/10/2017)
“From that incendiary announcement onwards, what happened was far from the peaceful activity that was formally requested” (Supreme Court, 09/03/2018)
“These events took place mostly in Barcelona at the regional economy ministry, at the regional foreign ministry, at the regional public administration ministry, at the headquarters of the Catalan Socialist Party (PSC), where socialist members were assaulted, at the headquarters of the Popular Unity Candidacy (CUP) and at the printing press in Biues i Riells; in Sabadell […] and at Les Franquese del Vallés…” (National High Court, 16/10/2017)
“The headquarters of the PSC was also attacked by the protestors and attacks even took place on socialist members.” (Public Prosecutor’s Office, 22/09/2017)
“…a large crowd of people gathered in front of the buildings being searched in order to prevent, by force, officers of the law from going about their legitimate duties and from complying with court orders.” (National High Court, 27/09/2017)
“…the day‘s events occurred under the siege of up to 60,000 protestors, whose mass piled up to the very front door of the building…” (Supreme Court, 09/03/2018)
“During the course of the day, the leaders of ANC and Omnium, Jordi Sánchez and Jordi Cuixart, made themselves out to be the representatives of the gathering, stating that they could move those gathered to their ends, trying to negotiate at least five times with security forces, proposing different options that were useful exclusively to their own political ends, never accepting those options that the specialists in public safety proposed to avoid or diminish the risks.” (National High Court, 16/10/2017)
“On top of a Civil Guard car with Jordi Sánchez, they called for ‘permanent mobilisation’ from Thursday onwards in favour of the referendum and against actions designed to stop it.” (Public Prosecutor’s Office, 22/09/2017)
“…preventing the people who had been arrested from being present at the search with their lawyers in the regional economy ministry building” (Public Prosecutor’s Office, 22/10/2017)
“At 22:36, the true intentions of the organisation ANC, that the suspects leads, were expressed when they took it upon themselves to clarify that: “the security cordon made up of ANC volunteers is not to make it easier for the Civil Guard to get out, as some media outlets have said”. (Public Prosecutor’s Office, 22/09/2017)
“The clerk of the court had to leave in the early hours of the following morning across the roof of the building, because the protestors were blocking her exit via the door.” (Public Prosecutor’s Office, 22/09/2017)
“The rest of the Civil Guard officers in the judicial party could not leave the building until 7 a.m. on the 21st because thousands of protestors were still there, and they had to be escorted out by the Catalan Police.” (Public Prosecutor’s Office, 22/09/2017)
“The mob destroyed three official vehicles.” (Public Prosecutor’s Office, 22/09/2017)
“The weapons inside the police cars were at the mercy of the vandalism deployed.” (Supreme Court, 21/03/2018)
“[The idea] the ANC volunteers were really protecting the Civil Guard vehicles is sarcasm, when they had to be towed away by a crane and the damage totalled more than €130,000.” (Public Prosecutor’s Office, 27/10/2017)
“Violent events that Mr. Oriol Junqueras i Vies himself attended and which were fostered because the forces charged with public order—under the responsibility of Mr. Joaquim Forn i Chiariello—encouraged [them] or did not deploy to bring them to an end. (Supreme Court, 04/12/2017)
“…hiding behind the literal nature of words is not acceptable when the main point is the participation in the seditious situation of breakdown in which the appellant suspect takes part, to decide on his personal situation.” (National High Court, 06/11/2017)
“…the appellant party is sticking not just to those two days but to specific sequences from them that are in his interest, to consider them exclusively as isolated acts, and, from there, not only to minimise the responsibility he might have had, but he even talks, despite his hostile attitude, described in the ruling, and that we accept, of an offer of collaboration from him, which, not without effort, could only be considered understandable as part of his defence, which we do not share” (National High Court, 06/11/2017)
“In conclusion, what is relevant from the behaviour of the suspect and what leads us to reject his appeal is the essential role conferred on his management capacity, and his actions, in the sense that he orients them, insofar as he forms part of a complex, agreed upon strategy directed towards declaring, outside of any law, the independence of Catalonia, of which the events of the 20th and 21st, by themselves enough to define the crime of sedition, are only another sample of a much broader seditious project.” (National High Court, 06/11/2017)
Security meeting on September 28, October 1 and the role of the Catalan Police
“On September 28, 2017, senior leaders from the Catalan Police met with the First Minister of the Government of Catalonia, the Deputy First Minister and the regional interior minister, Joaquim Forn i Chiariello.” (Supreme Court, 21/03/2018)
“At said meeting, they informed the members of the government that, although there had been a tacit agreement for non-violence up to then, the large number of groups mobilised at that time (including 42 Referendum Defence Committees, students, firefighters, etc.), made a breakdown as regards the past and an increase in violence foreseeable, with large outbreaks of conflict, so the security advice was to avoid the vote on October 1.” (Supreme Court, 21/03/2018)
“It becomes evident given all of the reasons exposed that the plan drawn up by Catalan Police headquarters was directed, immediately and directly, towards avoiding compliance with the Constitutional Court and regional high court orders, camouflaging those intentions under the appearance of a preferential application of the standards of congruence, opportunity, proportionality, social peace and coexistence.” (Cornellà, 28/03/2018)
“The empirical projection that the Catalan Police did not attend to court orders to stop the insurrection, choosing to submit to the illegal actions of the Government of Catalonia.” (Supreme Court, 09/05/2018)
“…both the Chief Public Prosecutor in Catalonia and the Civil Guard Colonel, Pérez de los Cobos, warned the Catalan Police that said guidelines were inadequate to be able to comply with the court orders they had received.” (Cornellà, 28/03/2018)
“Despite that, the decision by the members of the government was that the vote must be held.” (Supreme Court, 21/03/2018)
“On the other hand, the regional interior minister himself, who gave an order to continue with the referendum in that meeting on September 28, is [the person] who had to approve the Catalan Police operational plan, because despite the definition of a police operation being technical, it is subject to final approval by political leaders when it is a bigger operation, as the former director general of the Catalan Police testified in his statement.” (Supreme Court, 21/03/2018)
“…tells how the guidelines for action were sent out without a signature (without identifiable authors beyond a generic ‘headquarters’), under-utilising Catalan Police riot units, the BRIMO and ARRO.” (Cornellà, 28/03/2018)
“In the judgement of this investigator [judge]…there are rational indications of criminality as regards all of the members of the headquarters unit who were responsible for drawing up and approving [the guidelines].” (Cornellà, 28/03/2018)
“The same witness stated—and videos have been provided to back this—that, in some voting centres, it was the Catalan Police team that confronted the security forces [National Police and Civil Guard] to prevent them from closing the centre.” (Supreme Court, 21/03/2018)
“…the Catalan Police did not close any that morning and there are witness statements saying the polling stations they did close in the evening were closed once the vote had finished.” (Supreme Court, 21/03/2018)
“The Catalan Police already knew what was going to happen on October 1 and did not prevent it, drawing up an operational plan that they knew was going to fail from the start…” (Cornellà, 28/03/2018)
“Neither on September 30 nor on voting day did any of the specialist crowd control units act, nor were there any operations before 6 a.m. on October 1…” (Cornellà, 28/03/2018)
“Furthermore, until 6 a.m. on the day of the referendum, Sunday, October 1, 2017, they did nothing to clear people out of polling stations…” (National High Court, 04/04/2018)
“Far from that, however, the actions of the Catalan Police on October 1 were directed towards obstructing any actions that blocked the strategic plan towards independence.” (National High Court, 04/04/2018)
“They simulated a deceitful, fraudulent operation on October 1, leading their subordinates to a real dereliction of duty, not complying with court orders and the different aspects present in our legal system.” (National High Court, 04/04/2018)
“In this manner, the behaviour observed of the Catalan Police for the celebration of the referendum on October 1, 2017, masked behind the aforementioned police action guidelines of proportionality, congruence and opportunity, was that of total inactivity.” (National High Court, 04/04/2018)
“…it is inexplicable that only half of the force was on duty, some 7,500 officers, when there are 17,000 in total, and when on a normal election day some 12,000 officers are on duty.” (Cornellà, 28/03/2018)
“To ensure the success of the process towards the declaration of independence, it was essential to count on the investigative and intimidatory capacity of the Catalan Police, a police force composed of more than 17,000 armed officers, with the potential coercive effect that they represented.” (National High Court, 04/04/2018)
“On the one hand, it showed that the territory of Catalonia was outside of the police control the state normally relies on, to the extent that 17,000 armed officers were not responding to legal orders but to those of the suspects.” (Supreme Court, 09/05/2018)
The declaration of independence
“…on October 6, via a letter signed by the Deputy First Minister of the Government of Catalonia, Oriol Junqueras, the spokesman, Jordi Turull, and the regional foreign minister, Raul Romeva, the government of the autonomous community communicated to the Catalan Parliament the result of the referendum, holding that the ‘yes’ vote had won with 90.18% of the votes cast.” (Supreme Court, 21/03/2018)
“On October 10, 2017, the First Minister of the Catalan Government, Carles Puigdemont y Casamajó, appeared before the Catalan Parliament and, after accounting for the computation of the result of the vote, said he would respect the mandate of the people of Catalonia to turn it into an independent state in the form of a republic, but added that the Government of Catalonia and he himself, as First Minister, proposed suspending the effects of the declaration of independence in order to reach an agreed-upon solution.” (Supreme Court, 21/03/2018)
“Immediately after that event, MPs from the parliamentary groups Junts pel Sí and the CUP-CC, in a solemn event that happened outside of the chamber, signed a declaration of independence.” (Supreme Court, 21/03/2018)
“On October 19, Carles Puigdemont, after his prior petitions for [him/them] to be freed from their criminal accusations were not attended to…told the Prime Minister of the [Spanish] Government that the Catalan Parliament would proceed to vote on the declaration of independence.” (Supreme Court, 21/03/2018)
“On October 27, 2017, Lluis Corominas i Diaz, Marta Rovira i Vergés, Mireia Boyá Busquet and Anna Gabriel i Sabaté, chairpersons and spokespersons of their parliamentary groups Junts pel Sí and the CUP, tabled two resolution proposals for a vote in the chamber: the aim of the first was to declare the independence of Catalonia and that of the second was to begin a constituent process for the new republic.” (Supreme Court, 21/03/2018)
“On October 27, 2017, the Catalan Parliament, in virtue of the result of the supposed referendum on October 1, proclaimed the Catalan republic, as an independent sovereign state.” (Supreme Court, 09/05/2018)
Flight risk
“…the situation of several of the suspects who remain fugitives from the actions of justice, and the insistence on continuing on with the independence process, undermining constitutional legality and outside of the law, does certainly not suggest the disappearance of the risks that the precautionary measure of prison on remand means to remove.” (Supreme Court, 26/07/2018)
Risk of reoffending
“There also exists a risk of reoffending, given that the suspects have been operating within an organised group of people […] directed towards achieving the independence of Catalonia from the rest of Spain outside of the law, a process that is still underway.” (National High Court, 16/10/2017)
“Events of the same nature, in which both suspects have been involved in, have already taken place in the days following September 20 and 21.” (National High Court, 16/10/2017)
“The appellant’s prison on remand without bail was decided on because of the risk the suspect might encourage violent public mobilisations (or gravely contrary to public order and social peace) similar to the ones attributed to him in this investigation.” (Supreme Court, 14/12/2017)
“As has already happened with the other suspects, the appellant maintains his pro-independence ideas, which is constitutionally valid, but makes it impossible to be convinced of the impossibility of criminal reoffending, which one might be as regards someone who professes the opposite ideology.” (Supreme Court, 06/02/2018)
“…Mr. Sánchez has not only not renounced a public activity that—on several fronts—has served as an instrument for the execution of the events, but has also revalidated his commitment by joining a candidacy that proclaims the aim of reestablishing the political dynamic that led to the actions that gave birth to the responsibilities this criminal investigation is looking into and which led to the application of Article 155 of the Spanish Constitution [the suspension of home rule in Catalonia].” (Supreme Court, 06/02/2018)
“On the one hand, because the investigation shows that the participants in the crime agreed to persevere in their tactics, for as much as it came to a situation like the one we now find ourselves in, which is that the Spanish Senate was forced to approve the preventive reaction that it did [by suspending home rule in Catalonia].” (Supreme Court, 09/03/2018)